Abstract: Governance crises in corporate groups based on parent-subsidiary relationships have exposed the institutional limitations of traditional single-company oversight models.To systematically address the failure of parent-subsidiary oversight—particularly the issue of harm to parent company shareholders' interests—two theoretical approaches exist: the “transcending the firm” theory and the asset management theory.Among these, the asset management theory provides a theoretical foundation for the obligation of parent company directors to establish parent-subsidiary oversight mechanisms.The systematic construction of parent-subsidiary oversight mechanisms requires a three-pronged approach.First, regarding the choice of model, the foundational structure of the oversight mechanism should align with the parent company's level of control.Under the equity participation model, a “separate-type” oversight mechanism is adopted, with oversight functions in the parent and subsidiary operating independently and in parallel to safeguarding minority shareholders' right to participate in oversight; under the wholly-owned subsidiary model, an “integrated” oversight mechanism should be adopted; while the subsidiary's oversight body is retained in form, its functions are substantively integrated into the group's overall framework to achieve unified oversight standards, integrated information flow, and coordinated risk response.Second, regarding the allocation of duties, parent company directors bear a general duty of care toward the parent company; interpretively, this can be extended to include a duty to establish and maintain the parent-subsidiary oversight mechanism.To eliminate information asymmetry in parent-subsidiary supervision, parent company directors must also establish compliance investigation mechanisms and internal whistleblowing mechanisms.Furthermore, in cases where the duty to supervise and manage the subsidiary is not fully fulfilled, parent company directors should bear liability for breach of fiduciary duty toward the parent company, thereby indirectly compensating the parent company's shareholders for their losses.The scope of such liability is limited by the fact that parent company directors may raise defenses based on the business judgment rule or the doctrine of reasonable reliance.

Key words: Group Company, Oversight Mechanism, Director, Parent Company, Subsidiary

摘要： 以母子公司为基础的集团公司治理危机,暴露出传统单一公司监督模式的制度局限。为系统性地回应母子公司监督失灵,尤其是母公司股东利益受损的问题,在理论上有穿越公司理论和资产管理理论两种路径。其中,资产管理理论为母公司董事构建母子公司监督机制的义务提供了理论基础。母子公司监督机制的体系化构造需要从以下三个方面展开。首先,在模式选择维度上,监督机制的基础架构应当与母公司对子公司的控制强度相匹配。参股模式下采用“分体型”监督机制,母子公司监督职能各自独立、并行运行,以保障少数股东的监督参与权;全资控股模式下采用“一体型”监督机制,子公司监督机构的形式虽予保留,但其职能实质整合于集团整体框架,实现监督标准的统一、信息流动的整合与风险应对的联动。其次,在义务内容的规范构造上,母公司董事对母公司负有勤勉注意的一般性义务。在解释论上,可以从中阐释出其负有建立并维持母子公司监督机制的义务。同时,为了消除母子公司监督中的信息不对称现象,母公司董事有必要建立合规调查机制和内部举报机制。而且,在没有完全履行关于子公司的监督管理义务的情形中,母公司董事应当承担对母公司的违信责任,以间接弥补母公司股东的损害。此种违信责任的承担边界在于,母公司董事可以以商业判断原则或者合理信赖原则为由进行抗辩。

关键词: 集团公司, 监督机制, 董事, 母公司, 子公司