CHEN Jingshan
2026(5): 120-133.
Governance crises in corporate groups based on parent-subsidiary relationships have exposed the institutional limitations of traditional single-company oversight models.To systematically address the failure of parent-subsidiary oversight—particularly the issue of harm to parent company shareholders' interests—two theoretical approaches exist: the “transcending the firm” theory and the asset management theory.Among these, the asset management theory provides a theoretical foundation for the obligation of parent company directors to establish parent-subsidiary oversight mechanisms.The systematic construction of parent-subsidiary oversight mechanisms requires a three-pronged approach.First, regarding the choice of model, the foundational structure of the oversight mechanism should align with the parent company's level of control.Under the equity participation model, a “separate-type” oversight mechanism is adopted, with oversight functions in the parent and subsidiary operating independently and in parallel to safeguarding minority shareholders' right to participate in oversight; under the wholly-owned subsidiary model, an “integrated” oversight mechanism should be adopted; while the subsidiary's oversight body is retained in form, its functions are substantively integrated into the group's overall framework to achieve unified oversight standards, integrated information flow, and coordinated risk response.Second, regarding the allocation of duties, parent company directors bear a general duty of care toward the parent company; interpretively, this can be extended to include a duty to establish and maintain the parent-subsidiary oversight mechanism.To eliminate information asymmetry in parent-subsidiary supervision, parent company directors must also establish compliance investigation mechanisms and internal whistleblowing mechanisms.Furthermore, in cases where the duty to supervise and manage the subsidiary is not fully fulfilled, parent company directors should bear liability for breach of fiduciary duty toward the parent company, thereby indirectly compensating the parent company's shareholders for their losses.The scope of such liability is limited by the fact that parent company directors may raise defenses based on the business judgment rule or the doctrine of reasonable reliance.