Abstract: Many scholars and legal practitioners in China currently argue that the initiation mechanism of the “Conversion of Execution into Bankruptcy” procedure should be adjusted from the “party application-based model” and “court inquiry-based model” to a limited “ex officio model”.However, the ex officio initiation tends to overlook the procedural safeguards for party autonomy and interests of the parties involved in the process.This approach not only fails to achieve policy objectives such as resolving the practical difficulties of enforcing the rulings and clearing out “zombie enterprises”, but may also give rise to new legal procedural challenges and pose risks to the legitimate rights and interests of the parties involved.Furthermore, comparative legal studies have offered little support for such an approach.In the future, when the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is revised, the initiation of the “Conversion of Execution into Bankruptcy” procedure should continue to adhere to the “party application-based model” and the “court inquiry-based model” established by the incumbent legal structure, and adjust the specific measures from the aspects of applicant behavior incentives and supporting systems such as personal bankruptcy and mandatory corporate deregistration.

Key words: Conversion of Execution into Bankruptcy, Initiation, Ex Officio Model, Party Application-Based Model, Court Inquiry

摘要： 我国理论与实务界不少观点认为,应当调整执转破程序启动的“当事人申请主义”和“法院征询主义”模式,改而采取有限的“职权主义启动模式”。“职权主义启动模式”容易忽视对执行当事人意思自治和利益诉求的程序保障,不仅难以实现解决“执行难”、“僵尸企业”出清等目标,而且还可能衍生新的程序运转难题,并存在损害执行当事人合法权益的制度风险,比较法上也欠缺相应的借鉴依据。在《企业破产法》修订过程中,就执转破程序的启动,仍应坚持“当事人申请主义”原则,辅之以“法院征询主义启动模式”的现行做法,并围绕前述程序启动基本模式,从申请人行为激励和个人破产、强制注销公司登记等配套制度方面进行优化。

关键词: 执转破, 程序启动, 职权主义, 当事人申请主义, 法院征询