摘要： 尽管契约自由与契约严守在理论上仍被坚持,现实司法实践却普遍赋予消费者无理由解除预付式消费合同的权利,判令经营者返还大部分乃至全部未消费金额。这与行业普遍的禁止解除或低比例退款约定形成鲜明对比。行业条款的一致性未必源于行业串通,也可能反映出其在应对预付式交易特有结构时的理性尝试。与通常交易不同,预付式消费合同具有“供给有余量”与“固定成本占比高”特征。在消费者退出后,经营者无法实施替代交易,面临高昂的固定成本摊销落空。若支持近乎全额的未消费预付款返还,实则赋予消费者一种以经营者损失为代价的解除权。将此规则普遍化,不仅影响经营稳定,也很可能因供给减少而损害消费者整体利益。因此,规范层面不应赋予消费者以经营者损失为代价的任意解除权;对于消费者退出的客观需求,可通过司法实践划定可退事由,并配以余额就近重估规则予以满足。

关键词: 预付式消费合同, 任意解除权, 违约损害赔偿, 固定成本, 价格歧视

Abstract: Although freedom of contract and the principle of pacta sunt servanda remain formally recognized, Chinese courts frequently grant consumers a right to terminate prepaid consumption contracts without cause and often order businesses to refund most or all unused prepaid amounts.This approach stands in sharp contrast to the widespread industry practice of either prohibiting termination or allowing only limited refunds.The uniformity of such contractual terms does not necessarily result from industry collusion; rather, it may reflect a rational response to the distinctive structure of prepaid transactions.Unlike ordinary contracts, prepaid consumption contracts are characterized by the absence of substitute transactions and a high proportion of fixed costs.Once a consumer withdraws, businesses are often unable to mitigate losses through replacement transactions, while the recovery of fixed costs becomes frustrated.By routinely awarding near-full refunds, courts effectively create a no-cause termination right whose costs are borne by businesses.Generalizing such a rule may not only undermine operational stability but also reduce consumer welfare through diminished supply and higher prices.Accordingly, consumers should not be granted a right of no-cause termination at the expense of businesses.Legitimate withdrawal needs can instead be accommodated by recognizing specific grounds for termination and recalculating consumed services according to the pricing tier that would have applied absent the prepaid commitment.

Key words: Prepaid Consumption Contract, No-cause Termination, Damages for Breach of Contract, Fixed Costs, Price Discrimination