摘要： 经过三十余年的理论争议和判例矫正，2014年美国特拉华州最高法院在Kahn v.MFW中最终为上市公司私有化退市的“安全港”制度背书。经董事会特别委员会和少数股东多数决的公司治理内部机制是对控股股东重大利益冲突的双重清洁，商事裁判标准也由完全公平转为商业判断规则。美国式“安全港”的功能发挥有赖于诸多前提，整体运作成本较高，法律移植殊为不易。中国证券监管机构强制性地部分引入清洁机制，积极功能表现在迫使控股股东向公众股东披露信息，赋予公共股东一定的谈判力量，同时也导致法权保护的财产规则理论所预测的“敲竹杠”问题与效率减损。未来中国A股上市公司私有化退市中的利益冲突问题应从外部规制和内部治理机制两个层面进行制度完善。

关键词: 利益冲突, 上市公司私有化退市, 董事会特别委员会, 少数股东多数决, 自我执行

Abstract: Through the theoretical controversy and case correction over thirty years, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware of United States, finally endorsed the“safe harbor”for listed company privatization of delisting in v. MFW in 2014. Through double cleaning of major interest conflicts of majority stockholders by the internal company governance, which is decided by the Special Committee of board of directors and a majority of the minority shareholders, standard of commercial referee will fairly transform into business judgment rule. However, the functioning of American double-cleaning system depends on several premises, leading to higher overall operation costs and especial difficulties in legal transplantation. At present, Chinese securities regulators have compulsively introduced partial cleaning system to force majority stockholders to disclose the information to the public shareholders so as to endow public shareholders with certain negotiating power and have also led to the“hold-up”issue and efficiency loss predicted by the property rule theory of legal right protection. The institutional perfection for conflicts of interest in A shares listed company privatization of delisting in China should be conducted from two perspectives, external regulations and internal governance mechanism.

Key words: Conflict of Interest, Listed Company Privatization of Delisting, the Special Committee of Board of Directors, Majority of the Minority Shareholders, Self-Enforcing