摘要： 法学界对“宜兴冷冻胚胎案”的既有讨论过于关注“冷冻胚胎的法律属性”，而无论是一审判决中对继承权的认定，还是二审判决中的处置权和监管权，都不依赖于对冷冻胚胎法律属性的界定，而是依赖于更为一般的权利论证。该案的一、二审判决提供了两种不同的基础性理由，一种是基于“生育目的”来讨论权利是否存在，而另一种是基于“利益”来证成权利，背后分别体现了“意志论”与“利益论”的权利理论。比较而言，在理论上，利益论是一种更具有综合性的权利理论；在现实层面，利益论能够更开放地面对复杂的关系，体现出权利的动态性特征。我们需要走向一种中国式的利益论权利理论。

关键词: 宜兴冷冻胚胎案, 利益论, 意志论, 权利论证, 权利理论

Abstract: The academic analysis of the“Yixing Frozen Embryo Case”has focused too much on“the legal properties of frozen embryos”.However, when it comes to the problem whether there is an inheritance right in the first-instance judgment or a regulation and disposal right in the second-instance judgment to the frozen embryos, it does not depend on the definition of the legal properties of frozen embryos, but on a justification of rights.The first and second instance judgments provide two different basic reasons, one is based on the“fertility purpose”to discuss whether rights exist, and the other is based on“interest”to justify rights, which reflect the debate between the will theory and the interest theory of rights.Comparatively speaking, on a theoretical level, the interest theory is a more comprehensive theory of rights; and at the practical level, it can be more open to the complex relationships and reflect the dynamic characteristics of rights.We need to move toward a Chinese interest theory of rights.

Key words: The“Yixing Frozen Embryos Case”, The Will Theory, The Interest Theory, Justification of Rights, Theories of Rights