摘要： 国内对法律原则的研究模式大量援引德沃金的相关理论，却没能突出德沃金的一个重要定性：法律规则与法律原则存在质的差别。在这种一般模式之外，国内外学者在抽象程度之别、实定性之别、形式原则之别、理由类型之别等方面试图实现对法律规则与法律原则“质的差别”的建构。但是，这要么不符合德沃金的基本论述，要么无法实现德沃金的理论目标—挑战法律实证主义的法律概念理论。本文尝试提出一种解读：放弃分类学模式，不把法律规则和法律原则看作两种规范类型，而将其看作两种不同的规则理论。

关键词: 法律原则, 法律的概念, 规则的实践理论, 规范性规则, 客观道德

Abstract: The Chinese theories of legal principle normally overlooked an important point from Dworkin that the difference be-tween legal principle and legal rule is a quality distinction when citing his theory of legal principle. In order to explain thedistinction, many criteria had been suggested such as of generality, of canonicity, of formal principle, of types of reason,but these criteria did not fit Dworkin' s theory and not challenge legal positivism which Dworkin fiercely criticized. Thisarticle recommends a theory that the taxonomic model should be abandoned and legal principle and legal rule shouldn'tbeen took as a new type of norm but a new philosophical explanation on the nature of rule.

Key words: Legal Principle, The Concept of Law, Practice Theory of Rule, Normative Rule, Objective Morality