摘要： 在当代中国的国家治理中，超大型国家治理、中央集权单一制和“强国家—弱社会”这三重因素的共同存在，使得国家治理面临着巨大的治理负荷压力。为了有效应对统治风险、治理成本和质量压力等治理负荷难题，行政发包制作为一种可行的制度安排得以产生。相应地，由行政发包制的制度背景所决定，当代中国的地方法治在性质上属于一种独特的“承包型法治”样态，介于代理型法治和自治型法治之间，具有法治建设强激励、中央弱控制、争端解决方式行政化等特点。承包型法治建设具有两面性，容易造成政绩驱动型法治与权利选择性保护、法治试验的创新性与投机性、指标控制与指标应对、柔性运作与法制化解决间的一系列二元张力。承包型法治的未来转型，取决于行政发包制的可能变化，其转型前景和方向具有不确定性。

关键词: 地方法治, 中央与地方关系, 国家治理, 行政发包制, 承包型法治

Abstract: In the process of contemporary China's state governance, the status quo of ultra-large state governance, centralized unitary system and ‘strong state,weak society’ structure place China's state governance under a great pressure. In order to remedy the situation caused by the risk of rule, governance cost and quality pressure, administrative subcontract system as a feasible institutional arrangement has been introduced in actuality. Accordingly, determined by administrative subcontract system, the local rule of law in contemporary China belongs to a unique contracted managerial rule of law, lying between deputy rule of law and autonomous rule of law, manifesting its feature in the domain of incentive mechanism, central government control degree and dispute settlement system. The contracted managerial rule of law has double effects, i. e. on one hand, it stimulates local government to construct rule of law, go in for various kinds of local legal experiment and so on, and on the other hand, it brings about a series of problems such as selective rights protection, speculative local legal experiment, opportunistic index evaluation coping strategy and the like. Furthermore, the future transition of contracted managerial rule of law whose prospect and direction are uncertain depends on the possible change of administrative subcontract system.

Key words: Local Rule of Law, Relationship between Central and Local Governments, State Governance, Administrative Subcontract System, Contracted Managerial Rule of Law