摘要：

通过收集和分析最高人民法院在违约损失界定领域的判决，检验学界的解释学研究成果及其在裁判中的适用，可以发现，学界的解释论成果并未在法官(作为一个整体)的实践中得到适用，学界共享的解释论立场，也未为法官(作为一个整体)所采纳。与学界试图通过法教义学研究实现规则的统一性和稳定性，并缩小法官的裁量权不同，法官以扩充裁量权的方式展开推理。在这一推理模式下，表面看来相互矛盾的法律意见，均可得以正当化，并消解了学界的解释论立场及其法教义学结论。从短期看，法官的立场有其合理性，但从长期看，过多的自由裁量权导致不能实现同案同判，法官应放弃其过度泛化的裁量权主张。

关键词:  违约, 损失, 解释论, 裁量权, 实证研究

Abstract: This article，by analyzing the rulings of supreme court about the definition of the damages of breach of contract，tests whether theoretical conclusions and interpretational position held by academic circle could be applied by judges as a whole in adjudication.This article finds that，theoretical conclusions reached by academic circle are not applied by judges as a whole and the interpretational position held by academic circle is not respected by judges as a whole either.We find academic circle tries to reach uniform application and stability of legal rule by doctrinal research and narrowing the discretion of judges，but judges adopt different method and try to expand their discretional power.By the expanse of discretional power，judges can justify their paradoxical judicial opinions.As a result，the practical importance of academic doctrinal research disappeared.This article suggests that judges as a whole should give up their position because expansive discretional power will lead to different results for same situation and could not reach justice.

Key words: Breach of Contract, Damage, Interpretative Perspective, Discretional Power, Positive Research