摘要： 新古典与目的论结合体系下责任故意与构成要件故意的区分,是解决假想防卫等针对正当化事实前提产生认识错误最为妥当的方案。然而,这种方案在学理上催生出责任故意与违法性认识之间关系的新问题。该问题在我国不受限于境外立法上对故意与违法性认识进行分别规定的法律前提,可以从故意要素的结构和违法性认识的内容两个维度得到妥善处理。在故意要素结构的维度,二阶意志为基础的故意理论与我国《刑法》第14条的实质故意概念具有高度契合性,可以为构成要件故意与责任故意的区分提供学理依据。在违法性认识内容的维度,行为人对法秩序的敌对态度可以在行为人是否“知其所欲、想其所欲”的责任故意公式中得以判断。

关键词: 故意理论, 违法性认识, 责任故意, 二阶意志

Abstract: The distinction between Schuldvorsatz and Tatbestandsvorsatz under a combined neoclassical and teleological system is the most appropriate solution to the problem of cognitive errors arising from the premise of justified facts, such as hypothetical defense.However, this solution has given rise to a new doctrinal problem regarding the relationship between Schuldvorsatz and Unrechtsbewusstsein.This issue is not limited in our country by the legal premise that Vorsatz and Unrechtsbewusstsein are regulated separately in legislation abroad, and can be properly solved with in two dimensions: the structure of the Vorsatz and the content of Unrechtsbewusstsein.In the dimension of the structure of the Vorsatz, the theory of Vorsatz based on second-order will is highly compatible with the concept of substantive Vorsatz in Article 14 of the Chinese Criminal Code, which can provide the theoretical and interpretative basis for the distinction between Tatbestandsvorsatz and Unrechtsbewusstsein.In the dimension of the content of the Unrechtsbewusstsein, the attitude of the perpetrator towards the hostility of the legal order can be judged in the formula of Schuldvorsatz of whether the perpetrator “knows what he wants and thinks what he wants”.

Key words: Vorsatztheorie, Unrechtsbewusstsein, Schuldvorsatz, Second-Order Will