摘要： 我国垄断协议的安全港规则与美国、欧盟均不相同,多阶段决策模型为不同的安全港规则提供了解释框架,即各国安全港规则的设立、适用范围、法律后果都是在信息成本与错误成本之间寻求均衡的结果。相较于本身违法原则,安全港规则能有效降低反垄断决策过程中的假阳性错误,防止反垄断法的过度威慑。但与其他法域的安全港规则不同,我国最新通过的《反垄断法》采用的是抗辩模式,即经营者需要承担市场份额等监管机关所要求条件的证明责任。此种立法逻辑一方面是对我国现有“原则禁止+例外豁免”体系的路径依赖,另一方面是基于我国反垄断监管机构调查能力薄弱、人员不足和证据规则缺乏的现实考量,其本质是监管机构将高昂的信息成本分摊给被监管者。

关键词: 反垄断法, 安全港规则, 多阶段决策模型, 信息成本, 抗辩模式

Abstract: The safe harbor rule is used differently under China's antitrust laws as it is in the US and the EU for vertical and horizontal agreements.An interpretive framework is provided by the multi-stage decision-making model, which stipulates safe harbor rules differently in an effort to strike a balance between the cost of information and the cost of errors.The safe harbor rule can successfully reduce false positive mistakes and prevent over-deterrence by antitrust laws in the antitrust decision-making process when compared to the per se rule.However, pursuant to the newly passed Antitrust Law, China's safe harbor rule adopted a defense model, unlike other jurisdictions.The main idea behind this paradigm is to make the undertaking bear the initial burden of proof required by the regulator such as market share.On the one hand, this legislative logic is based on the path dependence of China's existing “principle prohibition+exception exemption” system, and on the other hand, it is based on the practical consideration of China's antitrust regulatory authorities with weak investigation capacity, insufficient personnel and lack of evidence rules.Its essence is that regulators allocate high information costs to the regulated.

Key words: Antitrust Law, Safe Harbor Rule, The Multi-Stage Decision Process, Information Cost, Defense Model