摘要: 借助于“客观上容许的风险”,客观归责理论将非典型的因果流程从刑法的关注范围中予以排除。而“客观上容许的风险”实际上是虚拟了“客观、标准的人格”,在先后进行客观归责和主观归责两次判断的过程中,客观归责这一步骤的存在并无实际意义,如果被告人具备特别认识,客观归责还会导致错误的结论。为“客观、标准人格”视角引入特别认识加以补强,并不足以挽救客观归责的缺陷,反而会使得客观归责不再客观。不宜采纳以“虚拟的标准人”判断为基础的客观归责理论,而应当由法官基于事后查明的全部事实,先后对结果、行为、故意(或过失)等要素都做规范化的理解。结果的归责,不应是指向虚拟人格的客观归责,而应是指向被告人真实人格的主观归责。
关键词:
非典型的因果流程,
客观归责,
特别认识要素,
规范化,
主观归责
Abstract: According to the theory of objective imputation, the irregular causations should be precluded through the objective criterion of“permitted risk”. The criterion of“permitted risk”has preinstalled a perspective of a fictive“objective-standard person”. Therefore, in the criminal theory that the judge should first carry out a step of objective imputation, and then that of subjective imputation, the first step is unnecessary. In the case that the perpetrator realizes his special knowledge, the theory of objective imputation can lead to a wrong conclusion. With the introduction of the so-called“special knowledge”into the theory of objective imputation, this imputation will be not objective any longer. It is not suitable to adopt the theory of objective imputation, which is based on a“fictive person”. The proper way is to understand and interpret the legal elements, such as result, action and intent(or negligence), normatively and basing on all the facts that ex-post found out. The imputation of criminal results is a subjective imputation that aims at the real perpetrator rather than an objective imputation towards a“fictive person”.
Key words:
Irregular Causations,
Objective Imputation,
Special Knowledge,
Normalization of Elements,
Subjective Imputation
蔡桂生. 非典型的因果流程和客观归责的质疑[J]. 法学家, 2018(4): 152-167.
CAI Gui-Sheng. The Irregular Causations and the Critics against the Objective Imputation[J]. , 2018(4): 152-167.