摘要： 数字人权的社会基础并非一体化的数字社会,数字技术只是强化但并没有根本改变工业社会的结构特征与运作逻辑,数字社会仍然是功能分化社会,数字人权也因此不具备代际变革的颠覆性意义。数字人权的基本功能是在数字时代继续维护各个系统的功能分化,限制各个功能系统借助数字技术所产生的内在扩张性,从而在个人身心系统与功能系统之间、不同功能系统之间确立合理的界限。数字人权可被区分为普遍功能性数字人权与特殊功能性数字人权。前者主要是指互联网接入权,其功能是在社会整体层面支持所有系统的涵括性与功能分化;后者主要是指生物人及其社会角色的数字人权,其功能主要是维护个人身心系统的完整性与自主性,以及社会角色所代表的功能系统沟通的自主性。

关键词: 数字社会, 工业社会, 数字人权, 功能分化, 互联网接入权

Abstract: The social basis of digital human rights is not an integrated digital society, and digital technology only strengthens but does not fundamentally change the structural characteristics and operational logic of industrial society.Digital society is still a functionally differentiated society, so digital human rights do not have the subversive significance of intergenerational change.The basic function of digital human rights is to continue to maintain the functional differentiation of various systems in the digital age, to limit the internal expansion of various functional systems generated by digital technology, so as to establish reasonable boundaries between individual physical and mental systems and functional systems, and between different functional systems.Digital human rights can be divided into universal functional digital human rights and special functional digitalhuman rights.The former mainly refers to the right of Internet access, and the function is to support the inclusive and functional differentiation of all systems at the level of society as a whole； the latter mainly refers to the digital human rights of biological people and their social roles, whose functions are mainly to maintain the integrity and autonomy of individual physical and mental systems, as well as the autonomy of communication of functional systems represented by social roles.

Key words: Digital Society, Industrial Society, Digital Human Rights, Functional Fifferentiation, the Right of Internet Access