摘要： 我国《反垄断法》中的转售价格维持正在面临着本土化移植的两难困境。该行为在经济学中具有两种对立的理论，在实务界存在欧美两套迥异的执法模式。这些冲突诱发了我国反垄断执法的异化，即行政执法机构与司法机构各执一端、各行其是。该问题的法学症结在于我国《反垄断法》对于由谁来承担该行为具有排除限制竞争效果的举证责任规定不明。本文发现司法机构的做法虽然合理，却不合法；行政执法机构的做法虽然合法，但不合理。最后，本文对我国《反垄断法》的本土化制约性要素进行分析，提出了转售价格维持的本土化执法路径，即由行政执法机构或原告来承担该行为具有排除限制竞争效果的举证责任。

关键词: 反垄断, 执法模式, 转售价格维持, 法律移植

Abstract: The enforcement against resale price maintenance(RPM)is being confronted with a dilemma in China.The Complexity of RPM lies in that on the one hand it is interpreted under two opposite schools of economics, and on the other hand it is enforced with two models represented respectively by the EU and the US.Such a controversy renders an enforcement diversity between competition agencies and justice.Legislative transplant must be built upon localized restrictive factors, of which compliance with local legal system remains the key.It is the crux that the Anti-Monopoly Law(AML)remains silent on who should bear the burden of proof for anti-competitive effects of RPM.This article observes that the practice of justice, though economics-oriented, is not compatible with the AML; and to the contrary, competition agencies' practice is compatible with the AML, and is nevertheless not economically reasoned.Finally, it approaches the discussion strictly based on the existing legal framework within the AML, and proposes a localized solution that competition agencies or plaintiffs should bear the burden of proof.

Key words: Antitrust, Enforcement Model, Resale Price Maintenance, Legislative Transplant