摘要： 中国《反垄断法》由三家机构竞争性执法是既有权力格局延续的产物。出于对执法冲突与执法懈怠的担忧，学术界和实务界普遍认为应当统一反垄断执法机构。但是，反垄断执法机构之间的竞争改变了科层组织完成目标所面临的关键因素。竞争产生了更便于比较的信息，从而在被动的监督与主动的执法上区别于垄断性执法模式。在对中国《反垄断法》执法实际状况的分析中可以看到，执法竞争克服了现有反垄断执法机构在科层结构中地位低、资源少的限制，在显性与非显性指标上都有较好的表现。与理论预设不同，现实中执法竞争的负面效果主要表现在刚性权威上。由于执法机构之间的竞争，加上反垄断执法机构面临宽松的制度约束以及法院改判的压力，可能引发执法退让与执法逼迫的双重效果。对此，提升执法的透明度，并通过反垄断民事诉讼以推动法律实施上的竞争是重要举措。

关键词: 执法机构竞争, 信息, 激励, 刚性权威, 制度设计

Abstract: Three authorities competing for law enforcement of Anti-monopoly law is the outcome of existing bureaucratic structure. Given the concerns of conflict and slack of enforcement, both academy and practice societies suggest establishing an unified anti-monopoly law enforcement institute. The competition of anti-monopoly authorities changed the key factors of achieving a goal in a bureaucratic organization. The competition among authorities generates more comparable information and distinguishes the monopoly authority from passive supervision and active enforcement. Based on the analysis of anti-monopoly law enforcement, the competition of law enforcement solves the certain issues of current law enforcement, e. g. low level in the bureaucratic system and limited resources.  It performs well in terms of explicit and implicit indicators.  Different from theoretic hypothesis, the impacts of competition in law enforcement are mainly caused by rigid authoritativeness. Competition in law enforcement under relatively loose system constraints and press caused by changing conclusion by a court, it may lead to recession of enforcement or compelling enforcement. In order to deal with it, it is important to promote the transparency of law enforcement and enhance civil procedure law of anti-monopoly.

Key words: Competition for Law Enforcement Authorities, Information, Incentive, Rigid Authoritativeness, Institution Design