摘要: 个人信息权作为一项独立的具体人格权,应能与隐私权等传统人格权相区分,目前司法裁判中出现的二者频繁重叠应予否定。个人信息权与传统人格权适用混乱的根源是,学界误认为二者的并存可通过权利竞合予以解决,忽视了数字社会是适用个人信息权的必要前提,也未能意识到个人信息权的核心问题与制度关怀。个人信息作为权利客体的本质特征是算法识别,由此决定了个人信息权的法律属性及其规则内容的特殊性,这成为区分个人信息权与传统人格权的实质要素。据此,并非所有“可识别”的信息都是个人信息权意义上的个人信息,亦非所有涉个人信息的纠纷都可以适用个人信息权予以解决。只有“算法识别”的信息才属于个人信息权客体范围内的个人信息;只有运用了算法技术的个人信息纠纷,才能适用个人信息权。
关键词:
个人信息权,
人格权,
算法识别,
自然识别
Abstract: As an independent specific personality right, the personal information right should be distinguished from other traditional personality rights such as the right to privacy, rather than frequently be claimed simultaneously in the current judicial adjudication.The root reasons for the muddled application concerning the personal information right and traditional personality rights are as follow: mistakenly considering that the coexistence of the two can be solved solely by the doctrine of concurrence of rights, overlooking the digital society is a necessary premise for the application of personal information right, as well as failing to realize the key problem and institution concern of the personal information right.As the object of right, the substantive characteristic of the personal information is personally identified or identifiable by algorithm, which determines the legal attribute of personal information right and the particularity of the rule, and thus becomes the substantive factor to distinguish the personal information right and traditional personality rights.Accordingly, not all identified or identifiable information is the object of the personal information right, and not all disputes related to personal information should be solved by the application of personal information right.The object of the personal information right should be limited to the information identified or identifiable by algorithm.Also, the disputes with algorithmic technology could be solved by the application of personal information right.
Key words:
Personal Information Right,
Personality Right,
Personally Identified or Identifiable by Algorithm,
Personally Identified or Identifiable by Nature
彭诚信. 论个人信息权与传统人格权的实质性区分[J]. 法学家, 2023(4): 146-159.
PENG Chengxin. The Substantial Distinction Between the Personal Information Right and Other Personality Rights[J]. The Jurist, 2023(4): 146-159.