摘要： 尽管从表面上看，中国传统司法审级中的“上控”与“审转”违反了“上诉审”的经济学原理，但本文的分析表明，这两种制度的出现实际上来源于古典司法复审的“政治治理”功能，并且在事实上构成了一种有效率的信息机制与“组织替代”，回应了古代社会低成本地获取地方治理信息的难题。但这些理论上合理的制度在实际的运行中也产生了许多问题，并且一直存在于当下中国的审级制度之中，其根本的解决进路只能是在国家能力建设基础上超越科层化的制度分工与审级分工。

关键词: 司法审级, 上控, 审转, 信息, 政治治理

Abstract: Superficially, the Shang Kong and Shen Zhuan in traditional Chinese judicial hierarchy were against the eco-nomic principles of appellate procedure，but this article shows that they were actually derived from the function ofpolitical governance, and they have become an effective information mechanism and institutional displacement.Although these institutions resolved the problem of acquiring the information of governance in ancient society,they also led to some drawbacks in practice. All these drawbacks still exist in the judicial hierarchy in modernChina, and the resolution is the institutional division of instances based on the development of state capability.

Key words: Judicial Hierarchy, Shang Kong, Shen Zhuan, Information, Political Governance