摘要: 债转股在企业破产中的适用应以法理兼容性与程序正当性为双重主线。实体法层面,代物清偿、有限责任与股份自由转让理论应与破产法的集体清偿原则相协调。程序法层面,债转股在企业破产中可适配的程序包括预重整、重整、和解。具体规则层面,企业破产中的债转股应依托重整与和解程序框架展开,核心聚焦表决、批准及退出机制。其一,债转股方案作为重整计划或和解协议的组成部分,其表决须遵循破产程序多数决规则,反对债权人可通过现金清偿退出,但不影响方案整体效力。其二,法院对债转股方案应进行形式与实质双重审查,强制批准须符合法定要件,和解协议禁止强制批准。其三,债转股后的股权退出须依托企业治理机制优化,通过调整管理层架构、设计合理退出计划并强化“府院联动”制度化路径,整合行政司法资源以保障退出可行性。
关键词:
企业破产,
债转股,
预重整,
重整,
和解
Abstract: The application of debt-to-equity swaps in corporate bankruptcy must rest on two foundational principles: legal doctrinal consistency and procedural due process.At the substantive law level, the doctrines of datio in solutum (payment in kind), limited liability, and the free transferability of shares must be harmonized with the overarching principle of collective creditor satisfaction embedded in insolvency law.Procedurally, debt-to-equity swaps may be integrated into various stages of insolvency proceedings, including pre-packaged plans, formal reorganization, and composition (schemes of arrangement).At the level of operational rules, debt-to-equity conversions should be implemented primarily within the frameworks of judicial reorganization and composition, with particular focus on voting procedures, court confirmation, and post-conversion equity exit mechanisms.First, where a debt-to-equity swap is incorporated into a reorganization plan or composition scheme, its adoption must comply with statutory voting thresholds under insolvency law.Dissenting creditors may elect a cash-out option, enabling them to exit the proceeding without undermining the overall effectiveness of the plan.Second, courts are required to conduct both procedural and substantive review of such proposals.Court-imposed confirmation (cram-down) is permissible only where statutory criteria are met, while compulsory confirmation is categorically precluded in the context of composition agreements.Third, the post-conversion exit of equity interests must be supported by robust corporate governance reforms.These include reconfiguration of the management structure, design of viable exit strategies, and institutionalization of coordinated government-judiciary mechanisms to integrate regulatory and judicial capacities, thereby ensuring the enforceability and viability of the exit process.
Key words:
Corporate Bankruptcy,
Debt-to-Equity Swap,
Pre-Packaged Plan,
Corporate Reorganization,
Composition Proceedings
钱宁. 企业破产中债转股程序构造论[J]. 法学家, 2025(5): 120-132.
QIAN Ning. On the Procedural Framework of Debt-for-Equity Swaps in Corporate Insolvency Proceedings[J]. The Jurist, 2025(5): 120-132.