摘要： 西耶斯并非决断主义制宪权观的源头。在他的理论体系中，制宪权仅限于决定政制，而人权作为价值规范是其前提和目标。制宪权的至上性只是相对于宪制权而言，它服从于国民主权原则之下的代表制，且蕴含以劳动分工为基础的分配正义。大革命之后，西耶斯意识到制宪权的危险并将其掩藏，构想了宪法审查会以实现违宪审查、宪法改良和人权的终极保障。我国“政治宪法学”与“规范宪法学”的主张者在论战中各执制宪权与人权，但都忽视了西耶斯这个重要的理论源头。特别是前者在阐释西氏的制宪权理论时切断了与人权的关联，将制宪权的客体从政制扩大到政治体本身，将规范主义替换为决断主义，忽视宪法在民主正当性之外的规范正当性。“政治宪法学”应当以积极姿态有效地融入人权话语，从而走出理论泥淖。

关键词: 制宪权, 人权, 宪制权, 西耶斯, 宪法的规范正当性

Abstract: The Abbe Sieyes is not the source of political decisionism conception of constituent power. In his doctrinal picture, constituent power is limited to determine the political structure whose precondition and purpose are human rights It has supremacy but only over the constituted powers. Being subject to the representative  regime ruled by the national sovereignty principle, constituent power contains the distributive justice principle based on labor division. After the Great Revolution, Sieyes realized the danger of constituent power  therefore froze it, then conceived jury constitutionnaire as an institution of constitutional review, constitutional reform and ultimate human rights guardian. In their contemporary debate, the political constitutional  law academy arms itself with constituent power and while normative constitutional law academy sticks to human rights, but both of them neglect Sieyes. In particular,  the political constitutional law academy isolates  Sieyes’ constituent power from his human rights theory, extends the object of constituent power from political structure to the political body itself，replaces Sieyes’ normativism with decisionism, and buries itself in the  democratic legitimacy of Constitution yet ignoring the normative legitimacy. The political constitutional law academy should effectively participate in human rights dialogue, in order to get itself out of the moral abyss.

Key words: Constituent Power, Human Rights, Constituted Powers, Sieyes, Normative Legitimacy of Constitution